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orts are unity. We present a necessary
and sucient condition for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium.
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er from unity, and derive the
implications of that speci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1 Introduction
In many economic situations, a number of contestants try to obtain some
prize or rent. Several mechanisms can be used to assign a prize to one of
the competitors. One obvious way to do so is through a regular auction.
Then, all contestants submit a bid and, as a rule, the one submitting the
highest bid obtains the prize, and pays an amount that depends in some pre-
described way on the total vector of bids. In the simplest case, the highest
bidder pays his own bid, whereas the other bidders pay nothing. For recent
surveys of this literature, see e.g. Wolfstetter (1996) or Klemperer (1999).
Another possible mechanism is the following. In the case of policy decisions,
the parties involved often exert eort in an attempt to influence the decision
process. This eort can take the form of lobbying, but can also consist of
bribes. Such a process can be modelled as an all-pay auction or a rent-seeking
contest. In an all-pay auction (see e.g. Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries, 1993),
all contestants have to pay for their eort, and the one with the highest eort
wins the auction. In a rent-seeking contest, all players also exert some eort,
but the outcome of the process is stochastic: each contestant wins with a
probability that is increasing in his own eort, but decreasing in that of his
competitors. The extensive literature on such contests started with Tullock
(1980). See further e.g. Dixit (1987), Hillman and Riley (1989), and for a
comprehensive survey, Nitzan (1994).
Yet, in practice, we often have situations that lie somewhere between the
two extremes of auctions and rent seeking. Often, when an auction is held,
the outcome is not solely determined by the height of the bid. In most cases,
other aspects of the competing oers also play a role. In public procurement,
the quality of the oers made is also taken into account, usually by some
predened rule that weighs dierent quantiable quality criteria of the oers
made. Another example is the procedure by which major sports events, such
as the Olympic Games, are assigned to cities or countries. On the one hand,
this decision is determined by bids the contestants submit, which come in
the form of e.g. the quality or quantity of new stadiums and infrastructure.
Yet, there is probably also room for some lobbying or bribing of the decision
makers. A nal example is a takeover battle. Suppose two rms try to take
over a third rm. Both rms submit a bid. Shareholders decide whom to
tender their shares to. Yet, they will usually base their decisions not only
on the bids submitted, but also on the extent to which they feel each rm
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contributes to the long-term prospects of the rm being taken over.1 Thus,
often, even if an auction is held, there is still room for lobbying or rent seeking
to try to influence the outcome of the auction.
In this paper, we try to model this notion. We build on the rent-seeking
literature, but assume that the probability of winning not only depends on the
eort exerted, but also on the bid made. In section 2, we describe our general
framework, and show that it can be seen as an extension of the standard
rent-seeking game. In section 3, we consider the simplest possible version
of our model in which returns-to-scale parameters of both bids and eorts
are equal to unity. For a given number of players, we present a necessary
and sucient condition for the existence of a unique (Nash) equilibrium in
which all players participate in the contest. We show that in that equilibrium
(a) each player submits the same bid, (b) the sum of all outlays equals that
bid, and (c) there is underdissipation of rent. Furthermore, we give explicit
equilibrium solutions for the case of equal valuations, and for the case in
which there are only two contestants. Section 4 uses a more general model,
in which the returns-to-scale parameters of bids and eorts may dier from
unity, and derives the implications of that specication. If an equilibrium in
which all players participate exists, it now has that the sum of all individual
ratios of the eort and bid, equals the ratio of the returns-to-scale parameters
associated with eorts and bids. We further present a sucient condition for
the existence of an equilibrium of this model for the case of equal valuations.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The general model
Our basic model is the following. There are n players trying to obtain some
prize. Player i values the prize at vi > 0: We thus allow for asymmetric
valuations. Each player can submit a bid bi  0, and spend eort ei  0:
The bid bi only has to be paid if i wins the prize. However, outlays ei are
sunk. A player cannot retrieve these, regardless of whether or not he wins
the prize. In general, we assume that the probability pi that i wins is given
1A related example: in a recent hostile takeover battle, the British telephone company
Vodafone bid some 132 billion euro to obtain control of its German rival Mannesmann.
Reportedly, both rms set aside a total amount of 850 million euro for this ght, trying to
influence the voting behavior of shareholders. From this amount, 150 million was reserved
for advertising. See The Economist (2000).
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by the logit form contest success function
pi(b1; : : : ; bn; e1; : : : ; en) =
f(bi; ei)Pn
j=1 f(bj ; ej)
; i = 1; : : : ; n; (1)
if bj > 0 and ej > 0 for at least one j; and pi = 0 if that is not the case.
Here, f(bi; ei) is non-negative, and @f=@bi; @f=@ei  0: This implies @pi=@bi;
@pi=@ei  0; and @pi=@bj ; @pi=@ej  0 (j 6= i). Thus, based on the bid bi and
the outlays ei, a ‘score’ f(bi; ei) is computed for each player. The probability
that a certain player wins this contest, is equal to the share of his score in
the total sum of scores. Note that these probabilities sum to unity.2 Given
(1), player i wants to maximize his expected payo, which is given by
i = pi (vi − bi)− ei: (2)
This expression reflects that the bid only has to be paid if the player wins
the prize, whereas the outlays are non-refundable.
A natural assumption is that the score f(bi; ei) links bi and ei in some
multiplicative fashion. In that way, we capture the idea that there is a trade-
o between increasing bid bi and increasing eort ei: In section 3, we simply
assume f(bi; ei) = biei, which we denote as a constant-returns-to-scale score.
Note also that in that case, the probability that player i wins the prize is
equal to zero if he submits a zero bid or exerts no eort. In section 4, we use




i ; with ;  > 0
returns-to-scale parameters of, respectively, the bids and eorts. Such a more
general function, however, leads to a less tractable model.





vi − ei: (3)
Many papers in this literature assume g(ei) = ei: Hillman and Riley (1989)
analyze this model, allowing for n contestants and asymmetric valuations.
Ellingsen (1991) gives an application. Our model in section 3 can be seen as
a generalization of this approach. Some papers, including Tullock (1980), use
a more general contest success function g(ei) = e
r
i ; with r > 0. Nti (1999)
2As long as at least one player both submits a positive bid and exerts a positive eort.
We assume that the contest is cancelled, i.e. the prize is not awarded at all, if none of the
players both submits a positive bid and exerts a positive eort.
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analyzes this model, allowing for asymmetric valuations, but restricting at-
tention to the case n = 2: Our model in section 4 generalizes this approach.
Finally, we refer to Skaperdas (1996) and Kooreman and Schoonbeek (1997)
for a general discussion of the foundations of logit form contest success func-
tions in rent-seeking models.
3 A constant-returns-to-scale score
In this section we use (1), with the constant-returns-to-scale score f(bi; ei) =






(vi − bi)− ei (4)
if bj > 0 and ej > 0 for at least one j, and i = 0 otherwise. We want to
investigate the (Nash) equilibria of the resulting model.
Without loss of generality, we rst order the valuations such that v1 











for 0 < b < vn: Observe that hn(b) is strictly increasing in b: Moreover,
limb#0 hn(b) = −1; and limb"vn = 1: This implies that hn(b) has a unique
root, b(n) say, on (0; vn), i.e. hn(b(n)) = 0. Using this, we present the
following theorem which provides a necessary and sucient condition for
the existence of a unique equilibrium in which all n players participate, and
which, moreover, gives general characteristics of such an equilibrium.
Theorem 1 Let the valuations be v1  v2  : : :  vn: There exists an
equilibrium (b^1; : : : ; b^n; e^1; : : : ; e^n) in which all n players participate, i.e. with
b^i > 0 and e^i > 0, 8i; if and only if the unique root b(n) of the function hn(b)
as dened in (5) satises b(n) < vn=2. If such an equilibrium exists, it is
unique and the bids and eorts satisfy:







i=1 e^i = b^.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus, in this model, where not only eorts but also bids determine the proba-
bility of winning the prize, all players submit the same bid in the equilibrium,
regardless of their valuation. This implies that in equilibrium, the fact that
bids are submitted does not play a role, i.e. dierences in the success prob-
abilities are solely determined by dierences in the outlays e^i:
We also have that in equilibrium the bid every participant submits, equals
the sum of total outlays. The equilibrium bid is less than one half of the
smallest valuation, vn. Furthermore, using (i) of Theorem 1 and (5), we see
that the equilibrium bid is strictly increasing in the size of the valuations of
the players, i.e. @b^=@vi > 0, 8i (note that for xed b, the rst term on the rhs
of (5) strictly decreases if one marginally increases the valuation vi, whereas
the second term remains constant). It also follows that the equilibrium bid
and eorts are linear homogeneous in the valuations, in the sense that if all
valuations increase with a same factor, then the equilibrium bid and eorts
all increase with this factor as well.
Using Theorem 1, we further see that e^1  e^2  : : :  e^n. Thus, the higher
the valuation of a player, the greater the eort he exerts in the equilibrium.
It can also be veried that in the equilibrium the probability that player i
wins the prize equals p^i = e^i=b^. This implies that p^1  p^2  : : :  p^n >
0. As a result, the player with the highest valuation also has the highest
probability to win the prize. The expected prot of player i corresponding
to the equilibrium can be expressed as
bi = (vi − 2b^)2
(vi − b^)
: (6)
Consequently, we obtain that b1  b2  : : :  bn > 0.
Theorem 1 considers equilibria in which all players participate in the con-
test. However, for arbitrary valuations, the root b(n) 2 (0; vn) of hn(b) of (5)
does not always satisfy b(n) < vn=2.
3 In that case, an equilibrium with all
n participating players does not exist. The same kind of problem appears
in the standard rent-seeking model with unequal valuations. To handle this
problem, Hillman and Riley (1989) propose an intuitively appealing proce-
dure in which only players with the highest valuations decide to participate
3Take e.g. v1 = 5, v2 = 4 and v3 = 2. Then b(3)  1:134 > v3=2.
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in the contest. Applying a similar procedure to our model, we can state that
agents n; n − 1; : : : will sequentially drop out of the contest until, for some









− k − 1
b
; (7)
for 0 < b < vk: In that case the equilibrium bid with the k players 1; : : : ; k is
given by this root.
Admittedly, this procedure, although appealing, has a drawback.4 Sup-
pose for example that n = 5; but there is no equilibrium with all ve players
participating. Then, rather for the player with the lowest valuation to drop
out, it may also be an equilibrium for the player with the second-lowest val-
uation to drop out. If he does, the condition just given may be satised for
the player with the lowest valuation.5
In the next two subsections, we demonstrate that the condition b(n) <
vn=2 holds | and thus that there exists a unique equilibrium in which all
players participate | if either all valuations are equal or n = 2. Note that
the latter implies that if we have a case in which there is no equilibrium
with n > 2 players participating, then the above procedure in which players
with the lowest valuations sequentially drop out, certainly provides us with
an equilibrium.
Concluding this section, we discuss the extent of rent dissipation that
occurs in the equilibrium of Theorem 1. First note that, in order to study
rent dissipation, we need a denition for that magnitude in the context of our
model. In the rent-seeking literature, the extent of rent dissipation is dened
as the total sum of outlays of the contestants trying to obtain the prize. Yet,
in our model, there is also a bid b^ paid by the winner. Arguably, this should
not be counted as rent dissipation, since it merely consists of a transfer from
the winner of the prize to the authority selling the prize. On the other hand,
one can argue that, when e^i consists of bribes rather than eorts, then these
bribes are also merely transfers. We therefore consider both possibilities.
First, suppose that the winning bid is considered as dissipated rent. Total
4Note that this proviso also holds for Hillman and Riley (1989) proposition 5, even
though they fail to point this out.
5To illustrate this possibility for the case n = 3, take again the valuations of footnote
3. There is no equilibrium in which all three players participate. However, for each
combination of two players there exists a well-dened equilibrium. See Corollary 2 below.
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rent dissipation then equals D =
P
i e^i + b^. Using Theorem 1, it follows that
D = 2b^ < vn. Thus, in this case there is always underdissipation of rent,
in the sense that total rent dissipation is less than the size of (even) the
smallest valuation of the prize. Second, if we suppose that the winning bid is





vn. Obviously, again there is always underdissipation of rent.
3.1 The case of equal valuations
Let us now consider the case in which all players have the same valuation.
We then obtain the following corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 If vi = v; 8i, then a unique equilibrium exists. The equilibrium
bids and eorts are given by:
(i) b^i = b^ =
(n−1)v
(2n−1) ; 8i,
(ii) e^i = e^ =
(n−1)v
(2n−1)n ; 8i.
Proof. Using vi = v, 8i, it follows that the root b(n) of the function
hn(b), dened in (5), is equal to b(n) = (n − 1)v=(2n− 1), thus b(n) < v=2.
From Theorem 1, there is a unique equilibrium. Moreover, from part (i) of
Theorem 1, the equilibrium bids equal b^i = b(n), 8i, hence part (i) of the
corollary. Finally, invoking symmetry, i.e. e^i = e^, 8i, part (ii) of the corollary
follows from part (iii) of Theorem 1.
Since, for this case, we do have explicit solutions for b^ and e^i; we can
also explicitly characterize the extent of rent dissipation that occurs in the
equilibrium. From Corollary 1, if the winning bid is considered as dissipated
rent, then total rent dissipation is 2
3
v with n = 2; and it strictly increases
to v as n goes to innity. If the winning bid is not considered as dissipated
rent, then total rent dissipation is 1
3
v with n = 2; and it strictly increases to
1
2
v as n goes to innity.
Next, we recall that total rent dissipation equals (n−1)v=n in the standard
rent-seeking model, see e.g. Hillman and Riley (1989). Thus, in our model,
total rent dissipation is lower than in the standard rent-seeking model when
b^ is not considered as dissipated rent, but higher when b^ is considered as
dissipated rent.
For the standard rent-seeking model, in equilibrium we can be shown to
have ei = e
 = (n − 1)v=n2; 8i, see again Hillman and Riley (1989). The
8
expected prot of contestant i then equals i = v=n
2: In our model, using







In a regular auction, it is easy to see that each player would bid the common
valuation of the prize (v), leaving expected prots equal to zero. Therefore,
in our auction with rent seeking, expected prots for contestants are higher
than in a regular auction, but lower than in a standard rent-seeking contest.
3.2 The case of two players
Next, we return to the general model in which valuations are allowed to
dier, but restrict attention to the case of two contestants, thus n = 2. We
then have the following corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 2 If n = 2, then a unique equilibrium exists. The equilibrium
bids and eorts are given by:











for i = 1; 2. Substituting b^ into (ii), we have an explicit solution for e^i:
Proof. Taking n = 2, it can be veried that the root b(2) of the function









Again, without loss of generality, assume that v1  v2: We then have to show
that b(2) < v2=2, i.e. v2 − 2b(2) > 0. Now,







2 − 3v1v2: (9)




2 − 3v1v2 > 2v1 − v2: (10)
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With v1  v2; the rhs of this expression is positive. Taking squares on both
sides and rearranging, (10) simplies to 3v22 > 0; which is always satised.
Using Theorem 1, a unique equilibrium exists. Parts (i) and (ii) of the
corollary follow directly.
Suppose we consider the winning bid b^ as dissipated rent. Total rent
dissipation then equals D = e^1+e^2+b^ = 2b^: Nti (1999) proposes the following
way to study how the extent of asymmetry in valuation influences total rent
dissipation. Without loss of generality, assume again that v1  v2, and write








1−  + 2

: (11)
Observe that @D=@ > 0: Thus, the more equal valuations are (i.e. the
higher  is), the higher total rent dissipation. Yet, this analysis is in terms
of a xed v1: More equal valuations then imply a higher v2; while keeping v1
xed. In this analysis, increased rent dissipation is not so much due to lower
asymmetry, but rather to a higher v2: This can be seen as follows. Rather








1−  + 2

: (12)
Now, @D=@ > 0: Thus, this suggests that having more equal valuations (i.e.
lower ) leads to lower dissipation, since we now do the analysis in terms of
a xed v2 rather than a xed v1:
A better way to study the eect of a decrease in asymmetry is the follow-
ing. Suppose the sum of valuations of both contestants is xed: v1 + v2 = V:
Using v1  v2; we may write v1 = V and v2 = (1− )V; with  2 [12 ; 1): We
can study the eect of decreased asymmetry as a decrease in , without the
problem of scale eects that aect the analyses above.


















Thus, rent dissipation is maximized when  = 1
2
; i.e. when the two valuations
are equal. Further, @D=@ < 0 for all  2 (1
2
; 1). Therefore, with two players,
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we unambiguously have that more equal valuations lead to higher total rent
dissipation. Remark that this result does not hinge on the denition of rent
dissipation. It does not matter whether or not we count b^ as dissipated rent.
If we do not, total rent dissipation simply equals D0 = 1
2
D:
4 A general Cobb-Douglas score
In the previous section, we analyzed a model where the returns-to-scale pa-
rameters associated with both bidding and rent seeking equal unity. In this
section, we use the more general Cobb-Douglas score function f(bi; ei) =
bi e

i . The returns-to-scale parameters satisfy ;  > 0: Hence, the model an-
alyzed in the previous section is a special case of this model, with  =  = 1:








1A (vi − bi)− ei (15)
if bj > 0 and ej > 0 for at least one j, and i = 0 otherwise.
For this model we have the following general result.
Theorem 2 Consider an equilibrium (b^1; : : : ; b^n; e^1; : : : ; e^n) in which all n







Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus, if we have an equilibrium in which all players participate, then the sum
of all individual ratios of the equilibrium eort and equilibrium bid, equals
the ratio of the returns-to-scale parameters associated with eorts and bids.
This theorem has a natural interpretation. As ; the parameter that reflects
returns to scale with respect to the eorts increases, then eorts become
more important, in the sense that the sum of the individual ratios of the
equilibrium eort and equilibrium bid increases. Also, as ; the parameter
that reflects returns to scale with respect to bids increases, then bids become
more important, in the sense that the sum of the individual ratios of the
equilibrium eort and equilibrium bid decreases.
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In order to analyse this model further, we make in the next subsection
the simplifying assumption that all contestants have equal valuations. We
remark that (even) for the case of two players, it is in general not possible
to nd the equilibrium in closed form.6
4.1 Equal valuations
Suppose that, in the model described above, all players have equal valuations.
We then have the following result.
Theorem 3 Suppose that vi = v; 8i, and   1. Then there exists a unique
equilibrium. In particular, the equilibrium bids and eorts are given by:
(i) b^i = b^ =
(n−1)v
(n−1)+n ; 8i;





Proof. See the Appendix.
In other words, when valuations are equal,   1 is a sucient condition for
the existence of a unique equilibrium, which is given by parts (i) and (ii) of
Theorem 3.
We make the following remarks with respect to the equilibrium bids and
eorts of Theorem 3. First, the bids and eorts are linear homogeneous in the
valuation v. Second, if the returns-to-scale parameter of bids, , increases,
then the equilibrium bids strictly increase as well, whereas the equilibrium
eorts strictly decrease. Third, if the returns-to-scale parameter of eorts,
, increases, then the equilibrium eorts strictly increase; however, there is
no eect on the equilibrium bids. Fourth, in the equilibrium the probability
that player i wins the prize equals p^i = 1=n, whereas his expected prot
equals bi = 1
n
(v − b^)− e^ = 1
n
 
nv − (n− 1)v
(n− 1) + n
!
; (17)
which is positive, because we assumed that   1.
6In the special case where  = 1, bids are again equal among agents, regardless of the
size of . This follows from (A.19) of the Appendix. The results given in section 3 can
easily be generalized to this special case. However, if  6= 1, bids are no longer equal
among agents.
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Using Theorem 3, we can again study the extent to which rent is dissi-
pated. To begin with, suppose that the winning bid is considered as dissi-
pated rent. We then have from Theorem 3 that
D = ne^ + b^ =
( + )(n− 1)v
(n− 1) + n : (18)
Consequently, with two contestants, total rent dissipation is (+)v=(+2):
The extent of rent dissipation strictly increases to ( + ) v=(+1) as n goes
to innity. Rent dissipation strictly increases in  and . In order to see





(n−  + n)2 (n− 1) v; (19)
which is positive, since by assumption   1.
Next, suppose we do not count the winning bid as dissipated rent. From
Theorem 3 we then obtain
D0 = ne^ =
(n− 1)v
(n− 1) + n: (20)
With two contestants, total rent dissipation now equals v=( + 2). The
extent of rent dissipation strictly increases to v=(+1) as n goes to innity.
Rent dissipation strictly decreases in ; but strictly increases in :
We conclude with two remarks. First, we see that total rent dissipation
strictly increases in  if the winning bid is considered as dissipated rent,
whereas total rent dissipation strictly decreases in  if the winning bid is not
regarded as dissipated rent. Second, it is easy to verify that if the winning bid
is considered as dissipated rent, then in equilibrium there is underdissipation
of rent. Obviously, this conclusion then also holds if the winning bid is not
considered as dissipated rent.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a model which combines elements of an auction
and a rent-seeking contest. The model considers a situation in which players
compete for a prize. The probability that a player wins the prize depends
not only on the amount of eort exerted, but also on the bid submitted. The
13
bid only has to be paid if the player wins the prize, the eort outlays are
sunk.
First, we discussed the model with constant returns to scale in both bids
and outlays. We presented a necessary and sucient condition for the ex-
istence of a unique (Nash) equilibrium in which all players participate. We
found that in the equilibrium all players will submit the same bid, regardless
of their valuations, and that total outlays equal that bid. Moreover, we found
underdissipation of rent, even if the winning bid is also considered as dissi-
pated rent. For the two player case, we showed that the extent of total rent
dissipation is strictly decreasing in the extent of asymmetry in valuations.
Second, we studied a more general model, in which the probability of
success depends on a general Cobb-Douglas function in bids and eorts. For
that model, we demonstrated that the sum of the individual ratios of the
equilibrium eort and equilibrium bid is equal to the ratio of their respective
returns-to-scale parameters. Focusing on the case of equal valuations, we
showed that the model has an equilibrium if the returns-to-scale parameter
of eorts is not greater than unity. We showed that in the equilibrium there
is underdissipation of rent, even if the winning bid is also considered as dis-
sipated rent. Total rent dissipation strictly increases in the returns-to-scale
parameter of eorts. Finally, if the winning bid is considered as dissipated
rent, then total rent dissipation strictly increases in the returns-to-scale pa-
rameter of bids, whereas if the winning bid is not considered as dissipated
rent, total rent dissipation is strictly decreasing in this parameter.
14
Appendix: Proofs of Theorems 1, 2 and 3
Proof of Theorem 1
To begin with, we state the rst-order conditions for an interior solution of
the expected prot maximization problem of player i, given the bids bj and







ei (vi − 2bi)− bie2i (vi − bi)P
j bjej














2 − 1 = 0: (A.2)
Note that while stating these rst-order conditions, we assume that bj > 0
and ej > 0 for at least one j 6= i.
Now, assume that (b^1; : : : ; b^n; e^1; : : : ; e^n) is an equilibrium with b^i > 0 and
e^i > 0, 8i: We then have to show that b(n) < vn=2 | where b(n) is the root
of hn(b) as dened in (5) | and that equilibrium bids and eorts satisfy
parts (i), (ii) and (iii) of the theorem. Using the rst-order conditions (A.1)
and (A.2), in the equilibrium we must have b^i < vi=2, 8i. Further, evaluated
in the equilibrium, (A.1) implies that0@X
j 6=i
b^j e^j



























The rhs of (A.5) is a constant, independent of i. Using this we can write
b^ for the bid of each player. Hence, the condition b^i < vi=2, 8i, reduces to









(vi − b^) = b^3, so




























= n− 1: (A.9)
From (A.9), b^ is a root of hn(b) of (5). Since hn(b) has a unique root, b^ = b(n),
and we must have b(n) < vn=2. Part (i) of the theorem is now obvious, and
parts (ii) and (iii) follow from, respectively, (A.7) and (A.6).
Next, assume that b(n) < vn=2. We then have to prove that there exists
an equilibrium in which all players participate. We will show that such
an equilibrium is given by (b^1; : : : ; b^n; e^1; : : : ; e^n), where b^i = b^ = b(n) and
e^i = b^(vi− 2b^)=(vi− b^), 8i. Remark that these bids and eorts satisfy b^i > 0
and e^i > 0, 8i. It remains to be shown that each player i maximizes his
expected prot by chosing bi = b^ and ei = e^i, given the choices b^j and e^j
(j 6= i) of his rivals.
Consider the maximization problem faced by player i, given these choices
of his rivals. First, notice that if player i chooses bi = 0, then his corre-
sponding optimal eort is equal to zero, and his expected prot amounts to
zero. Second, if player i chooses ei = 0, then his expected prot equals zero
irrespective of the size of his bid. Third, examine positive bids bi and positive
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eorts ei of player i, which satisfy the rst-order conditions (A.1) and (A.2).
It is convenient to write ci =
P
j 6=i b^j e^j. Note that ci > 0. Using (A.1) and
(A.2), it follows that for such bids and eorts of player i we must have
ci(vi − bi) = bi(biei + ci) (A.10)
and
cibi(vi − bi) = (biei + ci)2: (A.11)
From (A.10) we directly obtain that bi < vi=2. Further, (A.10) and (A.11)
imply that






Dene the continuous auxiliary function ki(b) = b
3− ci(vi− b) for 0 < b < vi.
By assumption, 0 < b^ < vi=2 and e^i > 0. Further, note that the rst-order
conditions of player i are satised if he chooses bi = b^ and ei = e^i. As a
result, b = b^ must be a root of ki(b), i.e. ki(b^) = 0. Moreover, one can
easily verify that ki(b) has no other roots. By implication, besides bi = b^ and
ei = e^i, there exist no other positive bid bi and positive eort ei which satisfy
the rst-order conditions of player i. Finally, we observe that the expected












which is clearly positive. As a result, player i indeed globally maximizes his
expected prot by choosing bi = b^ and ei = e^i.
Next, we present the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3. We rst make some
preliminary remarks. The rst-order conditions of an interior solution of the
expected prot maximization problem of player i in the model of section 4,













i (vi − bi)− bi ei






























2 (vi − bi)− 1 = 0; (A.16)
where we assume that bj > 0 and ej > 0 for at least one j 6= i. We observe














whereas (A.16) reduces to













Using these conditions we present the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3.
Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose that (b^1; : : : ; b^n; e^1; : : : ; e^n) is an equilibrium in which all n players
participate. In the equilibrium each player’s expected prot must be non-
negative, for otherwise the player will not participate in the contest. This
implies that we must have b^i < vi, 8i. We further know that the equilib-













Note that the rhs of this equality is a constant, independent of i. Thus, the
products b^+1i e^
−1







which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3
Assume that vi = v, 8i, and   1. We will show that there exists a unique
equilibrium, which is given by parts (i) and (ii) of the theorem.
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To begin with, we remark that the equilibrium must be symmetric, i.e.
bi = b and ei = e, 8i. It is obvious that the situation with bi = b = 0 and/or
ei = e = 0, 8i, is not an equilibrium. Further, substituting ei = e > 0 and
bi = b > 0, 8i, into the n rst-order conditions (A.17) and (A.18), it follows
directly that b = b^ and e = e^, where
b^ =
(n− 1)v






(n− 1) + n: (A.22)
This implies that there is only one possible equilibrium, i.e. bi = b^i = b^ and
ei = e^i = e^, 8i. In order to demonstrate that this indeed constitutes an
equilibrium, we have to prove that player i maximizes his expected prot by
choosing bi = b^ and ei = e^, given the choices b^j = b^ and e^j = e^ (j 6= i) of his
rivals.
Take the maximization problem faced by player i, given these choices of
his rivals. First, we see that if player i chooses bi = 0, then his corresponding
optimal eort is zero, and hence his expected prot equals zero. Second, if
player i chooses ei = 0, then his expected prot is zero independent of the
size of his bid. Third, let us examine positive bids bi and positive eorts ei
of player i which satisfy the rst-order conditions (A.17) and (A.18). In that
case, (A.17) and (A.18) reduce to






i (v − bi) = (bi ei + di)2; (A.24)
where for notational convenience we have dened di =
P
j 6=i b^e^. Note that
di > 0. It follows directly from (A.23) that we must have bi < v=(1 + ).
Observe that (A.23) and (A.24) are satised if player i chooses bi = b^ and
ei = e^ (note that 0 < b^ < v=(1 + ) and e^i > 0). We further remark that
the expected prot of player i corresponding to these choices equals
bi = 1
n
(v − b^)− e^ = 1
n
 
nv − (n− 1)v
(n− 1) + n
!
; (A.25)
which is positive, since   1. The proof is completed if we show that
besides bi = b^i and ei = e^i, there exist for player i no other bid bi with
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0 < bi < v=(1 + ) and eort ei > 0, which satisfy (A.23) and (A.24). In
order to show that, we distinguish two cases, i.e.  = 1 and  < 1.
First, take the case  < 1. From (A.23), we obtain that ei = si(bi), where
the continuous auxiliary function si(b) is dened as
si(b) =

di(v − ( + 1)b)b−(+1)
 1
 ; (A.26)
for 0 < b < v=(1 + ). Observe that si(b) is strictly decreasing in b, and,
moreover, that limb#0 si(b) = 1 and limb" v
(1+)
si(b) = 0.







i + di); (A.27)
which, in turn, with (A.23) implies that
2di(v − bi) = b+2i e−1i : (A.28)










for 0 < b < v=(1 + ). Since in this case we have  < 1, ti(b) is strictly
increasing in b, and limb#0 ti(b) = 0. As a result, the functions si(b) and ti(b)
have a unique point of intersection. By implication, this unique point of
intersection is given by b = b^. It follows that for player i there exist a unique
bid 0 < bi < v=(1 + ) and a unique eort ei > 0 which satisfy (A.23) and
(A.24), i.e. bi = b^ and ei = e^i.
Second, take the case  = 1. It then follows from (A.23) and (A.24) that
ei =




2di(v − bi) = b+2i : (A.31)
It is easy to verify that bi = b^ is the unique solution of (A.31). In turn, we
can conclude that for player i there exist a unique 0 < bi < v=(1+) and a
unique eort ei > 0 which satisfy (A.23) and (A.24), i.e. bi = b^ and ei = e^i.
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